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This paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the 
consumption effects of genetic modification (GM) under alternative labeling regimes and 
segregation enforcement scenarios. Analytical results show that if consumers perceive 
GM products as being different than their traditional counterparts, genetic modification 
affects consumer welfare and, thus, consumption decisions. When the existence of market 
imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of cost 
savings associated with the new technology to consumers, genetic modification results in 
welfare losses for consumers. The analysis shows that the relative welfare ranking of the 
“no labeling” and “mandatory labeling” regimes depends on: (i) the level of consumer 
aversion to genetic modification, (ii) the size of marketing and segregation costs under 
mandatory labeling; (iii) the share of the GM product to total production; and (iv) the 
extent to which GM products are incorrectly labeled as non-GM products.   
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CONSUMPTION EFFECTS OF GENETIC MODIFICATION: 
WHAT IF CONSUMERS ARE RIGHT? 
 




1.    INTRODUCTION 
Consumer concern about genetically modified (GM) food is one of the most 
notable features of agricultural biotechnology. Unlike farmers who have seen agronomic 
benefits in the new technology and have quickly adopted transgenic plants such as Bt 
cotton and corn and herbicide-resistant soybeans and canola (Economic Research 
Service), consumers have expressed reservations about the foods produced from these 
crops. Consumer opposition to genetic modification started in Europe and has spread to 
other countries.  
An Angus Reid poll in eight countries (France, Germany, UK, Australia, Canada, 
U.S., Japan, and Brazil) found that, among people aware of genetically modified foods, 
68 per cent on average indicate they would be “less likely” to purchase a food product if 
they knew it contained genetically modified ingredients. The proportion of respondents 
expressing aversion to GM foods varied between 57 per cent in the US and 83 per cent in 
Germany (Economist, 2000). In an earlier poll in the UK (MORI poll), 77 per cent of 
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those surveyed favored a ban on GM food. Consumer resistance to genetic modification 
is founded on health, environmental, moral and philosophical concerns about the “new” 
practice (Hobbs and Plunkett; Lindner).  
In response to this consumer reaction, a number of food companies such as Marks 
and Spencer, McDonalds, Sainsbury, and Tesco in the UK, Nestle in Switzerland, 
Carrefour in France, McCains in Canada, and Frito Lay in the U.S., have indicated that 
they are only accepting/selling non-GM products. Governments in the European Union 
and elsewhere have also responded by introducing mandatory labeling or by banning 
specific GM products (i.e. GM corn and canola in Austria, France, Greece, and 
Luxembourg) (Hobbs and Plunkett; Runge and Jackson). A requirement of the Biosafety 
Protocol signed by 130 countries in Montreal earlier this year is that shipments of food 
products that may contain GMOs are to be labeled as such. 
While labeling of food products satisfies consumer demand for the right to make 
informed consumption decisions (Caswell and Mojduszka; Caswell), the introduction of 
segregation and labeling raises a number of issues that affect everyone in the food chain. 
One issue is the added costs that segregation and labeling introduce and the economic 
impact of these costs on consumers. A second issue is that segregation and labeling 
activities create incentives for the misrepresentation and mislabeling of genetically 
modified food as traditional food. Although there is a growing literature on the nature and 
origin of consumer attitudes towards GM products, most of the analysis on the economic 
consequences of these attitudes is rather heuristic in nature. An exception is the paper by 
Plunkett and Gaisford who examine the welfare effects of introducing GM products, but 
do not consider consumer heterogeneity or examine the possibility of mislabeling. 3 
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a conceptual model that examines the 
consumption effects of genetic modification under alternative labeling regimes and 
segregation enforcement scenarios. More specifically, the paper analyzes the effect of 
genetically modified foods on the welfare and purchasing decisions of consumers under: 
(i) no labeling; (ii) mandatory labeling under full compliance; (iii) and mandatory 
labeling when misrepresentation of the type of the product (i.e. mislabeling) occurs.  
In analyzing the consumption effects of genetic modification, this paper explicitly 
accounts for consumer heterogeneity. To capture the different attitudes towards genetic 
modification, consumers are postulated to differ in the utility they derive from the 
consumption of GM food and therefore in their willingness to pay for this product. 
Consumer heterogeneity is critical in understanding how a demand for both GM and non-
GM products exists when labeling occurs.  
In this paper, the term genetically modified products refers to transgenics – the 
products in which some form of gene “splicing” has occurred. The new technology is 
assumed to generate production cost savings while having no effect on product 
characteristics that are observable by consumers; the analysis thus applies to goods that 
are credence in nature. 
The title of the paper stems from the major result of the analysis, namely that if 
consumers perceive GM food to be different from its non-GM counterpart, then there is a 
reasonable expectation that a percentage of consumers will correctly believe that the 
introduction of GM food lowers their utility and would prefer to see the product banned. 
The key factors that determine the magnitude of this welfare loss are the degree of 
aversion to GM foods, the degree to which the cost savings at the farm level are not 4 
 
passed through to consumers, and the magnitude of the costs associated with segregating 
non-GM products from GM products. Although this group would like to ban GM 
products, when faced with the introduction of GM products as a given, this group will 
prefer mandatory labeling to no labeling. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual model of the 
paper. Sections 3, 4, and 5 examine the effect of genetic modification on consumer 
decisions and welfare under no labeling, mandatory labeling with full compliance, and 
mandatory labeling with mislabeling, respectively. Section 6 compares and contrasts the 
no labeling and the mandatory labeling regimes while Section 7 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.  
2.    CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS AND BEHAVIOR 
The rise of consumer concerns over GM products and the diversity of these 
concerns suggests that consumers differ in their willingness to pay for GM versus non-
GM food products. In the simplest case consider a consumer that consumes one unit of 
either a traditional, a GM, or a substitute product. Assuming that the consumer spends a 
small fraction of total expenditure on the goods in question, her utility function can be 
written as:  
t t p U U - =   If a unit of traditional product is consumed  
c p U U gm gm l - - =   If a unit of GM product is consumed 
s s p U U - =   If a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
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where  t U  is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of the traditional product, 
gm U  is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of the GM version of the traditional 
product, and  s U  is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of a substitute product.
1 
The price of the traditional product is  t p , the price of its GM counterpart is  gm p , and the 
price of the substitute product is  s p . The parameter U is a per unit base level of utility 
while the term ëc gives the discount in utility from consuming GM product.
2 The 
parameter ë is a non-negative utility discount factor while the characteristic c differs 
according to consumer and captures the consumer’s aversion towards GM products. To 
simplify the analysis, the characteristic c takes values between zero and one. Consumers 
with large values of c prefer the traditional product rather than the GM product, all else 
equal. The assumption that lc is greater than or equal to zero is consistent with evidence 
showing that consumers are either indifferent or opposed to genetic modification (Hobbs 
and Plunkett). The analysis initially assumes that consumers are uniformly distributed 
between the polar values of c. This assumption is then modified to allow a bunching or a 
concentration of consumers at the ends of the spectrum (i.e. zero and one). 
                                                
1 One example of a product that could be supplied in both a traditional and a GM 
form is margarine made from canola. In this case, butter can be thought of as a substitute 
product. A second example could be corn chips (made from traditional or GM corn); the 
substitute product is potato chips. Other examples of traditional, GM, and substitute 
products include meat coming from animals fed with (traditional or GM) corn or soybean 
versus meat coming from animals that are barley fed. For simplicity and without loss of 
generality, it is assumed that the substitute product (butter, potato chips and meat coming 
from barley fed animals in the preceding examples) is free of GM ingredients. The 
implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed below in footnote 5. 
2 U can also be interpreted as the maximum willingness-to-pay (wtp) for a unit of 
the traditional or the substitute product. In such a case, consumer maximum wtp for the 
GM product equals U-lc. The difference between the wtp and the price of the 
(traditional, the GM, or the substitute) product provides then an estimate of the relevant 
consumer surplus.  6 
 
Differentiating Consumer Attribute (c)  
s p U -
t p U -
0   1  
Consumer Utility  
Figure 1 illustrates the situation where no GM product has been introduced. By 
assumption, the net utility associated with the traditional good is greater than that 
associated with the substitute good, i.e.,  s t p U p U - > - , for all consumers. In such a 
case, all consumers purchase the traditional good and total consumer welfare is given by 
the shaded area in Figure 1. The effect of introducing GM products into the market is 
examined in the sections below. 
 






3.    CONSUMER BEHAVIOR WHEN GM PRODUCTS ARE NOT LABELED 
Consider first the situation where a GM product is introduced, but no labeling of 
the product is carried out. Because the GM product and its traditional counterpart are 
marketed together, the price faced by the consumer, nl p , is the same regardless of which 
product is purchased. The lack of information about the type of the product being sold 
means that consumers are uncertain as to the nature of the product they purchase. Since 
the presence or absence of the genetic modification is not detectable with either search or 
experience, the genetic modification can be referred to as a credence characteristic 
(Nelson). Assuming a probability of ø that the non-labeled product purchased is GM, 
consumer utility is now:
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c p U U nl nl yl - - =      if a unit of non-labeled product is consumed 
s s p U U - =        if a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
 
where  nl U  is the expected per unit utility associated with purchasing the non-labeled 
product (i.e.  ( ) t gm nl U 1 U U y y - + = ).  
The consumption choice of the individual consumer is determined by the 
relationship between the utilities derived from the non-labeled product and the substitute. 
More specifically, the consumer with aversion to GM product given by:   
                                                
3 The probability that the non-labeled product is GM can be seen as reflecting the 
share of the GM product to total production (i.e., the portion of margarine that is 
genetically modified in the example provided in footnote 1). The greater is the production 
share of the GM version of the product, the greater is the likelihood that the non-labeled 
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is indifferent between consuming a unit of non-labeled product and a unit of the 
substitute–the utility associated with the consumption of these offerings is the same. 
Obviously, consumers with a lower aversion to genetic modification (i.e. consumers with 
c˛[0, 
*
nl c )) will prefer the non-labeled product while consumers with higher aversion to 
GM products (i.e. consumers with c˛(
*
nl c , 1]) will consume the substitute.
4 
Since consumers have been assumed to be uniformly distributed with respect to 
their aversion to genetic modification, the level of aversion corresponding to the 
indifferent consumer, 
*
nl c , also determines the share of the non-labeled product to total 
consumption, snl. The consumption share of the substitute, ss, is given by 1-
*
nl c . More 



















- =1  
 
                                                
4 The focus of the analysis on individuals that were consumers of the product 
prior to its genetic modification guarantees the positive sign of 
*
nl c . More specifically, for 
consumers to prefer the product prior to its genetic modification it should hold that 
s t p U p U - > -  where pt represents the price of the product before genetic engineering. 
Due to the cost savings associated with the new technology, the price of the non-labeled 
product pnl will be less than, or equal to, pt.     9 
 
Figure 2 graphs the determination of snl and ss. The downward sloping curve 
graphs the utility associated with the unit consumption of the non-labeled product for 
different levels of the differentiating attribute c, while the (continuous) horizontal line 
shows the utility derived from the consumption of the substitute. The dashed  t p U -  
curve is the utility curve prior to genetic modification. Thus, Figure 2 is constructed on 
the assumption that the price of the non-labeled product equals the price of the traditional 
product, i.e.,  t nl p p = . 
 
 
Figure 2  Consumption Decisions and Welfare Effects Under Genetic Modification and 
No Labeling  
yl  
s p U -
nl p U -
Consumer Utility  
0   1  
nl s s s
Loss 
Differentiating Consumer Attribute (c)  
t p U -
*
nl c
slope = 10 
 
  The intersection of the two (continuous) utility curves determines the level of the 
differentiating attribute that corresponds to the indifferent consumer, 
*
nl c , as well as the 
consumption shares of the non-labeled product and the substitute. Consumers “located” 
to the left of 
*
nl c  purchase the non-labeled product while consumers located to the right of 
*
nl c  find it optimal to consume the substitute. Consumer welfare under no labeling is 
given by the area under the effective utility curve shown as the bold kinked curve in 
Figure 2.
5 
Comparative statics results can easily be drawn from this model. More 
specifically, a decrease in the price of the non-labeled product shifts the Unl curve 
upwards and increases snl while an increase in the price of the substitute causes a 














). Finally an 
increase in l (i.e. an increase in the utility discount from consuming GM product for any 
level of c) and/or an increase in the likelihood that the non-labeled product is genetically 
modified, y, cause a clockwise rotation of the Unl curve through the intercept at  nl p U -  











                                                
5 Relaxing the assumption that the substitute product (e.g., butter or potato chips 
in the examples above) remains free of GM ingredients would result in a clockwise 
rotation of the utility curve associated with its consumption through the intercept at U-ps 
in Figure 2. Similar to the case of the non-labeled product, the slope of the new utility 
curve for the substitute product would be determined by the utility discount factor l, and 
the share of the GM version of the substitute product to its total production. Obviously, 
genetic modification of the substitute product reduces consumer welfare and increases the 
consumption share of the non-labeled product (i.e. margarine, corn chips) relative to the 
case where the substitute (i.e., butter or potato chips) remained in its conventional form.    11 
 
The effect of genetic modification on consumer welfare depends largely on the 
effect of the technology introduction on the market price of the non-labeled product. The 
effect of genetic modification on the final price of the product determines whether there 
will be any gains for consumers as well as the extent of losses due to consumer aversion 
to GM technology.  
More specifically, if the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages 
of the food chain prevents the transfer of the cost savings to the consumers, the price seen 
by consumers is not affected by genetic modification. As was noted above, Figure 2 is 
constructed on the assumption that the price of the non-labeled product remains 
unchanged, i.e.  t nl p p = . Under this assumption, the introduction of GM products 
represents a loss in welfare to consumers in aggregate. This loss in welfare is given by 
the hatched area. Although the consumers located at c = 0 experience no loss in welfare, 
all consumers located to the right of this point see their utility falling. The extent of the 
realized welfare loss depends on the level of consumer aversion to genetic modification c, 
the utility discount factor l, and the likelihood that the non-labeled product is GM, y.   
If the production costs savings due to genetic modification are transferred to 
consumers (i.e., in the case of a perfectly competitive food chain), the GM technology 
reduces the price of the product relative to the price prior to genetic modification,  , pt  and 
consumers with relatively low levels of GM aversion will realize an increase in their 
welfare. Consumers with relatively high aversion to GM products experience a reduction 
in their welfare since the price effect of genetic modification is outweighed by the utility 
discount from GM consumption. Figure 3 graphs the effect of genetic modification on 
consumer welfare when  t nl p p < . 12 
 
Figure 3.  Welfare Effects when Genetic Modification Reduces the Market Price, ( t nl p p < ) 
 
The analysis can be easily modified to examine cases where consumers are not 
uniformly distributed with respect to their value of c but, rather, are lumped at either end 
of the continuum. For instance, when consumers do not perceive GM products as being 
different from their conventional counterparts (i.e. when c=0 for all consumers), the 
introduction of the new technology will either leave the welfare of consumers unaffected 
(case where  t nl p p = , Figure 2), or will make all consumers better off (case where 
t nl p p < , Figure 3). On the other hand, when the aversion of all consumers is relatively 
high (i.e. when c=1 for all consumers), genetic modification will cause consumer welfare 
to fall. More generally, when the distribution of consumers is continuous (but not 
yl  
s p U -
nl p U -
Consumer Utility  
0   1  
nl s s s
Loss 
Gain 
Differentiating Consumer Attribute (c)  
t p U -
*
nl c
slope = 13 
 
uniform), the welfare effects of genetic modification depend on its skewness, i.e., the 
more skewed is the distribution towards 1, the greater are the losses and the lower are the 
gains (when  t nl p p < ) from the introduction of the new technology.   
Overall, the results of this section show that genetic modification and no labeling 
may result in some consumption switching to the substitute good and a net welfare loss. 
If the number of consumers experiencing a welfare loss is substantial, a ban could be both 
rational and welfare improving. For net consumer losses to be realized it must hold that: 
(i) the price decrease from genetic modification (if any) is relatively small; (ii) the 
discount in utility from consuming the GM product is high; (iii) the likelihood that the 
non-labeled product is genetically modified is high; and/or (iv) consumers are 
concentrated at the right hand edge of the aversion spectrum. 
4.    CONSUMER BEHAVIOR WITH MANDATORY LABELING AND FULL 
COMPLIANCE 
Consider now the consumer choice problem in an institutional arrangement with a 
mandatory labeling regime in place. In this case, traditional (non-GM) and GM products 
are segregated and marketed separately. Consumers now have a choice between a non-
GM labeled product, its GM labeled counterpart, and a substitute product. Consumer 





t p U U - =   if a unit of non-GM labeled product is consumed   
c p U U gm gm l - - =   if a unit of GM labeled product is consumed 14 
 




t p  is the price of the traditional product after the introduction of the new 
technology. All other variables are as previously defined. 
The GM product and the non-GM product are not necessarily priced the same. In 
fact for any (positive) quantity of the GM labeled product to be demanded (i.e. for  gm U  to 
exceed 
'
t U ), pgm should be less than 
'
t p . There are two reasons why the GM product will 
be priced lower than its traditional counterpart. First, mandatory labeling means increased 
marketing and segregation costs. These transaction costs associated with identity 
preservation cause consumer price to rise. The majority of these costs are incurred in the 
non-GM labeled product chain (Lindner), which, in turn, implies that consumers of the 
traditional product face a greater price increase.
6 Second, it is assumed that GM 
technology generates production cost savings at the farm level. Some, if not all, of the 
cost savings may be transferred to the consumer of the GM product. 
Not only does the existence of marketing and segregation costs imply that 
'
t gm p U p U - > - , the size of these costs significantly affects the consumption shares of the 
products being examined. More specifically, the greater are the marketing and 
segregation costs, the greater is the price increase of the non-GM labeled product 
(relative to the price of the product prior to genetic modification,  t p ), and the lower is 
the utility associated with the unit consumption of the non-GM labeled product, 
'
t U . For 
                                                
6 The segregation costs are higher for producers of the traditional product due to 
the effort required in preserving the identity of their produce by keeping it separate from 
the (inferior regarded) genetically modified one.  15 
 
relatively high marketing and segregation costs, the utility from consuming the non-GM 
labeled product might fall below the utility associated with the consumption of the 
substitute (i.e.  s
'
t p U p U - < - ). In such a case, consumers with a relatively high aversion 
to GM products will switch to the substitute product – there is no market demand for the 
traditional (non-GM) product. 
Figure 4 depicts the consumption decisions under mandatory labeling when 
marketing and segregation costs are relatively low (i.e. when  s
'
t p U p U - > - ). In this 
case, no consumer switches to the substitute. The consumption shares of the GM and 
non-GM labeled products are determined by the intersection of the  gm U  and 
'
t U  utility 















c p U c p U : c
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= ￿ - = - -  
 
is indifferent between consuming a unit of GM and non-GM labeled product – the utility 
associated with the consumption of these offerings is the same. Obviously, consumers 
with low aversion to genetic modification (i.e. consumers with c˛[0, 
*
l c )) prefer the GM 
product while consumers with high aversion to GM products (i.e. consumers with c˛(
*
l c , 
1]) consume the non-GM labeled product. 
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Figure 4   Consumption Decisions and Welfare Effects when Segregation Costs are 
Relatively Low ( s
'
t p U p U - > - ) and pgm< pt 
 
When consumers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of c, 
*
l c  also 
determines the share of the GM product to total consumption, sgm. The consumption share 
of the non-GM labeled product, st, is given by 1-
*
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Obviously, the share of the GM labeled product falls with an increase in its price 
and/or the utility discount factor and increases with an increase in the price of the non-





















When the transaction costs from mandatory labeling are relatively high (i.e. when 
s
'
t p U p U - < - ), a portion of consumers switch to the substitute product. The 
consumption shares of the GM product and the substitute product are determined by the 
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Similar to the case of smaller marketing and segregation costs examined above, 





















The welfare effects of genetic modification under mandatory labeling clearly 
depend on the effect of GM technology on the price of the GM product. More 
specifically, if the price of the GM product is less than the price of the product prior to its 
genetic modification (i.e. if pgm <  t p ) consumers with relatively low aversion to genetic 
modification will gain from the new technology. Consumers with relatively high aversion 
to GM product experience a reduction in their welfare due to: (i) the utility discount from 18 
 
GM consumption; and (ii) the price increase of the traditional product caused by the 
marketing and segregation costs. Note that for pgm to be reduced relative to pt, two 
conditions should be met. First, the market structure must be such that production costs 
savings from the GM technology are transferred to consumers and, second, the price 
effect of the reduced production costs should outweigh the effect of increased transaction 
costs associated with mandatory labeling on the market price of the GM product.  
Figure 4 graphs the effect of genetic modification on consumer welfare when 
marketing costs are relatively low (i.e.  s
'
t p U p U - > - ) and pgm < pt. The dashed  t p U -  
curve is the utility curve prior to genetic modification. For net consumer gains to be 
realized it should hold that: (i) the price decrease from genetic modification is relatively 
high, (ii) the discount in utility from consuming the GM product is relatively low, and/or 
(iii) the marketing and segregation costs are relatively low. A bunching of consumers at 
the left-hand edge or the right-hand edge of the diagram would increase the gain or loss, 
respectively. 
More specifically, the greater is the price reduction from genetic modification, the 
greater is the upward shift of the  gm U  curve, the greater are the consumer gains and the 
lower is the welfare loss from the new technology. Similarly, the lower is l, the greater is 
the slope of the  gm U  curve, the greater are the gains and the lower are the consumer 
losses from genetic modification. Finally, the greater are the marketing and segregation 
costs incurred in the non-GM product chain, the greater is the downward shift of the 
'
t p U -  curve and the greater are the consumer welfare losses from the new technology.  19 
 
Figure 5 depicts the welfare effects of genetic modification when the transaction 
costs from mandatory labeling are relatively high (i.e. when  s
'
t p U p U - < - ) and pgm ‡ pt. 
In this case, there are no consumers gaining from the new technology. The extent of the 
realized welfare losses depends on the level of aversion to genetic modification c, the 
utility discount factor l, and the level of pgm. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Consumption Decisions and Welfare Effects when Segregation Costs are 
Relatively High ( s
'
t p U p U - < - ) and pgm ‡ ‡ pt 
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5.    CONSUMER BEHAVIOR UNDER MANDATORY LABELING: THE 
EFFECT OF MISLABELING  
This section of the paper analyzes the consequences of mislabeling on consumer 
purchasing decisions and welfare. Mislabeling refers to the case where producers or 
processors misrepresent the type of the product sold in the market; they label GM 
products as non-GM in an attempt to capture the price premium paid for traditional (non-
GM) produce.  
When incidents of mislabeling occur in the food marketing system, consumer 
trust in labeling falls. Consumers can be expected to assign a probability to the event that 
what is labeled “non-GM” product is in fact genetically modified. Because of the 
uncertainty regarding the nature of the product consumed, the utility derived from the 
consumption of non-GM labeled product, 
m
t U , equals  [ ] ( )[ ]
' ' 1 t t p U c p U - - + - - q l q  
where q  is the likelihood that the non-GM label is false and the product is actually 
genetically modified.
7  
Taking into account this uncertainty, the consumer utility under mislabeling 
becomes:  
c p U U '
t
m
t ql - - =   if a unit of non-GM labeled product is consumed   
c p U U gm gm l - - =   if a unit of GM labeled product is consumed 
s s p U U - =   if a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
 
                                                
7 Note that the consumer utility when the non-GM labeled product is GM is given 
by  c p U
'
t l - -  (rather than  c p U gm l - - ) since the price paid for the consumption of the 
product is 
'
t p  (and not pgm). 21 
 
Relative to the situation of full compliance examined in the previous section, 
product misrepresentation results in a discount in the utility associated with the 
consumption of the non-GM labeled product. Graphically, this utility discount can be 
seen as a clockwise rotation of the utility curve associated with the non-GM labeled 
product through the intercept at 
'
t p U -  in Figures 5 and 6.  
 
Figure 6  Consumption and Welfare Effects of Mislabeling when Segregation Costs are 
Relatively Low  ( s
'
t p U p U - > - ) 
 
Consider first the case where marketing and segregation costs are relatively low 
(i.e.  s
'
t p U p U - > - ). Compared to the case where mislabeling does not occur, mislabeling 
reduces both consumer welfare (shaded area in Figure 6) and the consumption share of 
s p U -
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the non-GM labeled product. A portion of the (previously) non-GM labeled product 
consumers (i.e. those with c˛(
*
l c , c1]) switch to the GM labeled product while consumers 
with relatively high level of c (i.e. consumers with c˛(c2, 1]) switch to the substitute. The 
greater is the probability è that the non-GM label is false and/or the greater is the utility 
discount from the consumption of GM products, ë, the greater are the welfare losses from 
mislabeling and the greater is the share of non-GM consumers that switches to GM 
product and the substitute.    
In the presence of mislabeling, the consumption share of the GM labeled product, 
gm s , equals c1, the share of the non-GM labeled product,  t s , equals c2-c1, while 1-c2 
percent of consumption moves to the substitute. Mathematically, the consumption shares 
can be written as:   
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When the marketing and segregation costs are relatively high (i.e. when 
s
'
t p U p U - < - ), then mislabeling–as opposed to full compliance-has no effect on either 
the welfare or the consumption decisions of consumers since in this case no traditional 
(non-GM) product is consumed (see Figure 5).  23 
 
6.    NO LABELING VERSUS MANDATORY LABELING  
After having analyzed the consumption effects of genetic modification under the 
“no labeling” and the “mandatory labeling” regimes, the question that naturally arises is 
which labeling regime dominates in terms of its effect on consumer welfare. Or, put in a 
different way, since the introduction of GM products can result in net welfare losses 
under both the “no labeling” and the “mandatory labeling” regimes, what is the labeling 
regime that harms consumers the least?  
The determination of the factors affecting the relative performance of the two 
labeling regimes is straightforward. Figure 7 shows the effective utility curves under no 
labeling (dashed kinked curve) and mandatory labeling under full compliance when the  
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marketing and segregation costs are relatively low (solid kinked curve).  For simplicity 
and without loss of generality the figure depicts the situation where the price of the non-
labeled product pnl equals the price of the GM labeled product pgm.   
The shaded area NL reflects consumer utility under the no labeling regime that is 
lost when mandatory labeling is introduced. Similarly, the area ML represents consumer 
utility that is lost from a switch from mandatory labeling to no labeling. Obviously, 
consumers located to the right of c
+ will favor mandatory labeling, while for consumers 
located to the left of c
+ no labeling is the preferred labeling regime. The ranking of the 
labeling regimes in terms of their net effect on consumer welfare depends on the relative 
size of the shaded areas in Figure 7; if NL is greater than ML, then no labeling is the 
superior labeling regime. Obviously, when the assumption of a uniform distribution of 
consumers is relaxed, the welfare ranking of the two labeling regimes is affected by the 
skewness of the distribution. In general, the greater is the number of consumers that are 
characterized by a relatively high aversion to GM products (i.e. the more skewed towards 
one is the distribution of consumers with respect to their value of c), the greater is the 
likelihood that mandatory labeling is the preferred labeling regime. 
Comparative statics results can easily be derived from Figure 7. For instance, an 
increase in the likelihood that the non-labeled product is GM (i.e. an increase in y) 
causes a clockwise rotation of the  nl U  curve ( nl U = c p U nl yl - - ) that increases ML and 
reduces NL. The greater is y, the greater is the consumer support for mandatory labeling. 
Similarly, an increase in the marketing and segregation costs associated with mandatory 
labeling will shift the 
'
t p U -  and  c p U gm l - -  curves downward increasing NL and 
reducing ML. The greater are the marketing and segregation costs, the greater is the 25 
 
proportion of consumers favoring no labeling; when marketing and segregation costs are 
relatively high (i.e. when  s
'
t p U p U - < - ) the area ML vanishes and no labeling is the 
superior labeling regime.  
Finally, when the assumption of full compliance is relaxed and the possibility of 
product misrepresentation is introduced, the mandatory labeling regime becomes even 
less appealing from the consumers’ standpoint; mislabeling increases the likelihood that 
no labeling is superior in terms of its effects on total consumer welfare. The greater is the 
probability that mislabeling occurs, the greater are the consumer utility losses under 
mandatory labeling, and the greater is the likelihood that an all-or-nothing choice among 
the two labeling regimes in terms of their effect on consumer utility will favor no 
labeling. 
7.    CONCLUDING REMARKS   
This paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the effects of 
genetic modification on the welfare and purchasing behavior of consumers. The 
conclusion of this paper is that if consumers perceive GM foods to be different from their 
traditional counterparts, then demands for the banning of GM products and GM labeling 
are rational. For instance, when the existence of market imperfections in one or more 
stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of the cost savings associated with 
the GM technology to consumers, then the introduction of GM foods will generally result 
in welfare losses for consumers. This is true no matter the labeling regime that is in place.  
Given that GM foods have been introduced into the food system, the analysis also 
shows that the relative welfare ranking of the “no labeling” and “mandatory labeling” 26 
 
regimes depends on: (i) the level of consumer aversion to genetic modification, (ii) the 
segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling; (iii) the share of the GM product to 
total production; and (iv) the extent of mislabeling. More specifically, the greater are 
segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling, the greater is the likelihood that no 
labeling is the superior labeling regime. The greater is the likelihood that the non-labeled 
product is GM, the greater is the likelihood that mandatory labeling will be preferred.  
Finally, when the possibility of product mislabeling is introduced into the 
analysis, the desirability of mandatory labeling by consumers falls. The uncertainty about 
product characteristics due to mislabeling reduces consumer welfare and drives part of 
non-GM product consumers out of the market. The lower is the level of trust in the 
labeling system, the greater is the expectation that mislabeling occurs, the greater are the 
consumer utility losses under mandatory labeling, and the greater is the likelihood that an 
all-or-nothing choice among the two labeling regimes in terms of their welfare 
implications favors no labeling. 
The results of this paper can provide an explanation of policy decisions about 
genetic modification and labeling observed around the world. Relatively low (or zero) 
consumer aversion to genetic engineering coupled with a reduced price of GM foods and 
significant segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling could be among the 
reasons why a “no labeling” policy has been adopted by countries like the United States 
and Canada. Increasing consumer concerns, however, and the relatively high level of 
consumer trust in the food safety institutions in both countries could increase the relative 
efficiency of – and hence the consumer demand for – mandatory labeling.  27 
 
A relatively high aversion to genetic modification coupled with a lack of a price 
reduction for GM foods would rationalize mandatory labeling, an outcome seen in 
various EU countries. However, a high level of distrust of food safety and inspection 
systems can undermine the value of labeling. This result sheds light on the demand for an 
outright ban of GM products by some European consumers, since faith in the food 
inspection system there has been reduced because of food safety scares such as the 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy crisis in the British beef industry. 
In summary, consumer concerns about GM products can be expected to affect 
consumption decisions and to influence the public policy response demanded by 
consumers. These consumption decisions, along with the decisions made by policy 
makers as to how GM products are introduced into the food system, can have significant 
impacts on the demand for GM products throughout the food system. These system 
effects, in turn, will affect the decisions made by farmers as to which crops they grow and 
decisions by life science companies as to the pricing of the GM technology and the 
development of new technologies.  28 
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